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Argentina has ﬁ nally restructured its foreign debt. Its credit 
rating is up, and its debt is back in the index. Th e new bonds 
are trading roughly in line with Brazil and Uruguay’s, just above 
400 basis points over treasuries for instruments of comparable 
duration. Argentina is raising new money from foreign investors. 
Earlier in the summer of 2005, it reopened a domestic dollar 
issue to accommodate excess foreign demand. Argentina and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are on again. Th ey might 
even sign a new disbursing program after the fall 2005 congres-
sional elections. Like a bad dream, the 2001 default is fading 
into the night after three years of brisk growth and impressive 
ﬁ scal management—even as the usual nabobs natter on about 
structural reform and unhappy bondholders.
Has the biggest sovereign debt default in history passed 
without answering the urgent legal and policy questions it posed, 
and with barely a ripple in the global ﬁ nancial markets? So far, 
pretty much. Which is not to say that the episode is over or that 
it has been unimportant.
Before its foreign bond exchange, Argentina owed about 
$82 billion in principal and $20 billion in past due interest. 
Hundreds of thousands of creditors held 150 kinds of defaulted 
instruments issued in six currencies under the laws of eight juris-
dictions. Creditors owed just over 76 percent of the total, or $62 
billion in principal, got $35 billion in new performing bonds. 
Other performing debt at the time of the exchange included 
over $40 billion in domestic and about $30 billion in multi-
lateral obligations. Argentina left behind almost $25 billion in 
defaulted principal and interest.
Th e scale of Argentina’s operation is a multiple of earlier 
bond restructurings: Russia exchanged on the order of $30 
billion, Ecuador $6 billion, Uruguay $5 billion, Ukraine $3 
billion, and Pakistan under $1 billion. Th ese and other crises 
spread anxiety about the international system’s ability to manage 
ﬁ nancial globalization. Th e trauma and drama of Argentina’s 
debt default in 2001 seemed to validate this anxiety. Overnight, 
Argentina’s middle class plunged into poverty, and Italian retir-
ees lost their savings. With so many lives and so much money at 
stake, expectations ran high that Argentina’s restructuring would 
instantly change the world of emerging-market sovereign debt.
Th e high stakes may help explain the unusually contentious 
tone of the debt exchange. All involved felt profoundly aggrieved 
even as they disagreed vigorously on whom to blame. Foreign 
investors blamed a succession of Argentine governments and 
the IMF; Argentine politicians blamed one another, the foreign 
investors, and the IMF; the IMF blamed Argentine politicians, 
the markets, and G-7 fecklessness; and the Argentine public 
blamed all of the above.
Just as soon as the Argentine government announced the 
results of its tender on March 18, 2005, editorial pages world-
wide heralded a new era for sovereign debt, for the emerging 
markets, and occasionally for international ﬁ nance. Th eir views 
on Argentina’s lessons were as disparate as they were deﬁ nite. 
Some said the exchange would close the markets to middle-
income countries. To others, it reaﬃ  rmed the markets’ resilience. 
Some claimed it proved the need for statutory sovereign bank-
ruptcy. Others said it clearly discredited the idea. Most spoke 
too soon.
By the time the deal settled in June 2005, it had conﬁ rmed 
many presumptions about emerging-market debt and shattered 
none. So far, lawsuits have not yielded a penny for the credi-
tors. Th ey failed to stop the exchange or dent Argentina’s recov-
ery. Bondholders failed to stick together; the markets failed to 
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banish a defaulter; and the oﬃ  cial sector failed to change the 
outcome.1 Even documentation for the new securities breaks 
little new ground. Smaller restructurings that came before 
might look more revolutionary for introducing the tools, such 
as aggregated collective action clauses, that Argentina adapted 
on such a vast scale.
Th e real lessons of Argentina’s restructuring so far are more 
subtle and complex than the surrounding commentary. Th e 
default and the exchange were both points in a longer ﬁ nancial 
restructuring process that began before the default and will go 
on for years after the exchange. Argentina’s unorthodox debt 
management immediately before and after the default is partly 
responsible for the outcome of the exchange. With $25 billion 
in defaulted debt still outstanding, Argentina’s most impor-
tant innovations may well be ahead.
Th e default and the passage of time shifted bargaining 
leverage to the debtor. Already overextended in Argentina by 
the time of the default, the IMF had little ﬁ nancial or politi-
cal capital left for policy activism postcollapse. If anything, it 
innovated by omission. But private creditors failed to ﬁ ll the 
resulting policy gap to enhance their own position. For Argen-
tina, restructuring external debt was bound up with allocating 
losses from the ﬁ nancial crisis and political realignment after 
2001. Its government committed to deliver a deal on its own 
terms, and it generally succeeded. Will this encourage others 
to default or to pursue punitive restructurings? What recourse 
is left for the creditors? And what, if anything, can the oﬃ  cial 
sector do after Argentina to project a constructive vision of 
sovereign restructurings?
P R O LO G U E :  D O M E S T I C  D E B T  A N D 
OT H E R  G Y M N A S T I C S
Argentina’s latest round of troubles began after Russia 
defaulted and Brazil devalued in 1998–99 (Mussa 2002). Its 
“convertibility” regime—the one-to-one peg of the Argentine 
peso to the US dollar—helped defeat hyperinﬂ ation in 
the early 1990s but required sustained access to external 
ﬁ nancing. Argentina ran perennial budget deﬁ cits. Th e dollar 
was high, commodity prices low. As markets closed and 
exports collapsed, the government turned to oﬃ  cial lenders, 
domestic banks, and pension funds to ﬁ nance its budget and 
trade deﬁ cits.
In 2001, three years into a recession, Argentina’s hopes 
1 Th e oﬃ  cial sector comprises the IMF, World Bank, regional development 
banks, G-7 and G-10 governments, and the group of bilateral creditors that 
meet in the Paris Club.
for economic growth looked increasingly fanciful absent dras-
tic, painful policy change. Th at year the government launched 
three operations that tried and failed to solve its debt problem 
(Republic of Argentina 2005a). In February, it swapped about 
$4 billion in external bonds, extending near-term maturities. 
Th e famous mega-exchange in June pushed oﬀ  maturities on 
over $30 billion at the cost of increasing Argentina’s foreign-
currency, foreign-law debt stock and raising the spreads to 
levels that undermined market conﬁ dence.
Th e third exchange was more unusual. In November 
2001, Argentina oﬀ ered to swap about $42 billion in foreign 
bonds for loans governed by Argentine law and secured by 
dedicated tax revenues. Th e exit instrument was designed to 
appeal to Argentine ﬁ nancial institutions that had come to 
hold about 40 percent of the government’s foreign bonds. 
(Russia’s default and punitive restructuring of its treasury bills 
had made foreign investors brieﬂ y wary of domestic-law debt.) 
Th e exchange dramatically reduced Argentina’s foreign-law 
debt and helped partially to segregate investors with diﬀ erent 
preferences into diﬀ erent instruments.
Th e swap did not prevent default on Argentina’s foreign 
bonds, which came on Christmas Eve in 2001 after the IMF 
refused further disbursements. Convertibility collapsed, and 
the peso fell to a quarter of its precrisis value. After weeks of 
riots and a succession of presidents, Argentina enacted emer-
gency measures that led to more dramatic changes in its debt 
stock. It converted into pesos all public and private domestic-
law debt, including the loans resulting from the November 
exchange. Th ese loans continued to perform throughout the 
default episode, albeit in pesos and at even lower interest rates. 
Th e government then proceeded to issue over $20 billion in 
dollar- and peso-denominated domestic-law debt (primarily 
the Boden bonds) to compensate domestic constituencies for 
damage from the crisis. Th e Boden paid low interest rates, and 
only a small portion of them traded. Th ose that traded became 
a favorite among foreign investors, who calculated that the 
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government would not default on the obligation that now 
formed much of the capital in the Argentine banking system. 
Th e net result was a radical transformation of Argentina’s 
debt stock. Before the November 2001 exchange, December 
2001 default, and February 2002 “pesiﬁ cation,” almost 70 
percent (nearly all the debt owed to private creditors) was in 
performing foreign-currency, foreign-law bonds. A year later, 
these bonds represented just over a third of the total and were 
mostly in default, trading at some 20 cents on the dollar. 
Performing debt comprised almost $40 billion in domestic-
law instruments and over $30 billion in debt to multilateral 
institutions. Foreign bonds regained some of their share in 
mid-2003, when Argentine pension funds that had rejected 
pesiﬁ cation of their guaranteed loans were forced to revert to 
their defaulted global bonds.
Th e identity of Argentina’s creditors also changed over 
time, most dramatically in the past three years. In the mid-
1990s, Argentina borrowed chieﬂ y from foreign institutional 
investors. As the recession wore on and institutional interest 
wore thin, Argentina tapped unprecedented numbers of Euro-
pean, and to a lesser extent Asian, retail investors. In the run-
up to the crisis, it turned to multilateral and captive domestic 
institutions. After the default, compensation bonds expanded 
the holdings of domestic creditors. Meanwhile, specula-
tive investors—mostly foreign institutions—began to buy 
performing domestic debt and soon defaulted foreign bonds.
Th ese changes, some driven by the markets and others by 
Argentine policies, helped shape the debt exchange in 2005.
T H E  O F F E R :  D U B A I  T E R M S  F O R  A L L
Argentina ﬁ rst broached the restructuring terms with its 
creditors at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Dubai 
in September 2003, almost two years after the default. Th e 
“Dubai Terms” set a political benchmark for the government—
75 percent debt reduction and no recognition of past due 
interest (potentially 90 percent in present value terms at 
market discount rates).
Th e creditors were outraged. Th ree months after Dubai, 
disparate investor groups united under the umbrella of the 
Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders (GCAB) to pool 
negotiating leverage and demand a better deal. Th e commit-
tee claimed to represent about $40 billion in US, European, 
and Japanese creditors. It joined forces with another group 
representing Argentine nationals.
Several GCAB members sought to represent retail inves-
tors in Europe and Asia. Th ese investors generally were not 
repeat players and knew little about emerging-market debt. 
Many individuals bought Argentine bonds for their retire-
ment accounts from European and Japanese banks. After the 
default, Argentina and its institutional creditors found it hard 
to predict retail behavior.
GCAB unveiled its own “Dubai Terms” in response to 
a slightly improved proposal from Argentina in June 2004, 
valued at about 20 cents on the dollar (GCAB 2004). Creditor 
demands included full recognition of past due interest and 
recovery values over 60 cents on the dollar. One Wall Street 
analyst wrote that the group was “repeating the government’s 
strategy in Dubai: to present something that will hardly help 
in the very same negotiation process” (Deutsche Bank, July 
13, 2004).  Th ese polar opposite positions set the tone for 
the remainder of Argentina’s restructuring, as competing road 
shows grew increasingly strident.
In the end, GCAB did not move, and Argentina moved 
some. In January 2005, the government oﬀ ered a ﬁ nal menu 
of par, discount, and quasi-par bonds that the markets valued 
slightly above 30 cents on the dollar. It included instruments 
linked to Argentina’s future economic growth and added a 
small amount of cash by backdating the exchange to Decem-
ber 2003. During this period, the authorities sustained budget 
surpluses unprecedented by Argentine standards, as the 
economy grew by over 8 percent. Th is economic performance 
both made Argentina a more attractive credit and seemed to 
validate creditor contentions that it could pay more.
But the biggest change took place in the markets. In the 
15 months since the Dubai meetings, spreads on emerging-
market debt fell dramatically as global investment capital 
searched for yields. Interest rates in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan were at historic lows. What might have looked like 
an outrageous oﬀ er in 2003 looked more attractive using 2005 
discount rates. GCAB’s institutional constituents were quietly 
peeling oﬀ ; some began buying up defaulted debt from retail 
investors who had lost patience. In the end, most institutions 
appear to have tendered in the exchange. Even as Italian retail 
leaders publicly denounced what they called Argentina’s cram-
down, billions of dollars in Italian retail holdings were tender-
ing or selling to participating funds. Th e largest single pool 
of retail claims, representing over $1 billion in German and 
Austrian investments, accepted Argentina’s oﬀ er two hours 
before the deadline.
What had looked like the new dawn of creditor organization 
seemed to ﬁ zzle overnight. GCAB’s website fell silent—it posted 
no reaction to the exchange. True to the atomistic stereotype, 
sovereign bondholders could not hold a coalition. Each acted in its 
own self-interest; most came to see Argentina’s oﬀ er as an opportu-
nity for short-term gain or at least a chance to cut their losses. For 
now, the sovereign debtor seemed to hold all the cards.
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L I T I G AT I O N :  B O N D S  I N  L I M B O
In one sense, any transaction of over $80 billion that demands 
unprecedented debt relief and attracts over three-quarters of the 
creditors is a triumph. Argentina’s was all the more impressive 
because it proceeded against the background of thousands of 
creditor lawsuits, most in Argentina but also dozens in New 
York and over 100 in Europe.
Th e conventional wisdom before Argentina’s default was 
that getting a judgment against a government was much easier 
than collecting on it. Since the Brady exchanges of the 1990s, 
a steady undercurrent to this wisdom had emerged arguing 
that litigation might yet become a potent creditor weapon. 
Th is reasoning held that once sovereign debt took the form 
of tradable bonds rather than relationship-driven bank loans, 
a default would send thousands of bondholders storming the 
courts to demand 100 cents on the dollar. A rush to the court-
house would jam up negotiations, delay the country’s recovery, 
and inﬂ ict greater losses on the creditor collective.
Until Argentina, the most prominent and successful hold-
outs2 sued on loans, not bonds (as in Elliott Associates v. Peru). 
Rather than block restructuring, they sought to proﬁ t from 
its success. A country that has restored its payment capacity 
could better aﬀ ord to pay ransom; moreover, its return to the 
global markets created oﬀ shore payment streams that litigants 
could target. Most puzzling perhaps was the fact that coop-
erating creditors seemed unfazed by the holdouts. Th ey saw 
payments to the holdouts as a modest tax on the restructuring 
that kept the threat of enforcement real, perhaps deterring the 
debtor from defaulting on the margins. At the same time, the 
still-considerable risk, hassle, and expense of sovereign debt 
litigation deterred emulators.
Several times Argentina looked like it might challenge 
conventional wisdom, as many of its bondholders did go to 
court in large numbers (Republic of Argentina 2005a). Several 
bondholders secured judgments and at various stages tried to 
stop the exchange oﬀ er. A fund owned by the Dart family, 
well-known for its holdout litigation prowess, got a judg-
ment for $725 million. Th e remaining individual judgments 
represented a tiny fraction of the debt—about $15 million 
all told. Th en the New York District Court certiﬁ ed a class 
action against Argentina, which could have reached $4 billion 
in claims. But none of this seemed to matter as Argentina 
marched on with its $62 billion exchange. Lawsuits seemed 
2 Holdouts are creditors who refuse to participate in a debt restructuring.  
Some hold out for better restructuring terms; others refuse to participate in 
any collective restructuring and sue for full payment.
powerless to stop it, and in the words of the presiding judge in 
New York, “not only have they not yielded a hundred cents on 
the dollar, they have not yielded one cent on the dollar.”
Th e march suddenly stalled on March 21, 2005, when 
NML Capital Ltd., an oﬀ shore fund with connections to 
Elliott Associates, moved to seize the defaulted bonds that 
Argentina had accepted for the exchange.3 NML argued 
that the bonds, which were ostensibly locked up in custodial 
accounts in New York4 for Argentina’s beneﬁ t, were assets of 
the debtor that had market value and could be sold to satisfy a 
future judgment. Because the bonds’ market value was a frac-
tion of their face value, NML initially succeeded in freezing 
$7 billion in bonds tendered by participating creditors to pay 
its own $360 million claim. Other holdouts, including the 
Darts, shortly joined NML.
Argentina’s lawyers argued among other things that 
the bonds did not belong to Argentina but to the tendering 
holders, that the bonds could not be Argentina’s assets and 
liabilities at the same time, that if Argentina ever came to hold 
the bonds they would have no value because it would cancel 
them immediately, and that the government would sooner 
scrap the entire $62 billion deal than go forward without 
the frozen bonds. Th e creditors pointed out that nothing in 
Argentina’s contracts required it to cancel the bonds or to stop 
the exchange. Since Argentina would come to hold the bonds 
sooner or later, the court should prevent the government from 
destroying them and instead make it turn the bonds over to 
the creditors. 
Th e trial court eventually ruled in Argentina’s favor but 
kept the bonds frozen for two months while the creditors 
appealed. Th e federal appeals court in New York upheld the 
decision in a terse summary order that stressed the trial judge’s 
discretion to deny remedies that might pose a risk to the overall 
debt exchange, which, in turn, was important to Argentina.5 
3 See NML Capital, Ltd., et al. v. Republic of Argentina, hearing transcript, 
March 29, 2005, United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.
4 Argentina contested the bonds’ precise location.
5 See EM Ltd. et al. v. Th e Republic of Argentina, summary order, May 23, 
2005, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, New York.
Argentina’s  crisis  seems to suggest that 
default  shifts  the balance of  power in favor 
of  the debtor absent official  inter vention.
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Th e order may not be cited as precedent, but it reveals some-
thing about judicial thinking. Surely most large-scale sovereign 
debt restructurings are important for the debtor country. And 
in this case, “risk to the exchange” was at least to some extent 
a function of Argentina’s refusal to proceed while some bonds 
were frozen. If future judges use similar reasoning, preclosing 
challenges look increasingly remote.
Some observers expressed dismay at the appellate court’s 
decision to let the exchange go forward on procedural grounds 
(the scope of the trial court’s discretion). Th e ruling is frus-
trating for its failure to resolve the substantive legal issues 
whose seriousness the judges acknowledged. Nevertheless, the 
court’s critics are unduly harsh. Every policy entity involved in 
Argentina’s debt default was trying to have its cake and eat it 
too. For example, the IMF seemed to call both for polite nego-
tiations and for a sustainable debt proﬁ le, yet it refused to pass 
judgment on Argentina’s payment capacity. Th e US executive 
branch continued to aﬃ  rm the sanctity of contracts while 
pursuing their renegotiation and to insist on a solution that 
was free-market yet also polite and sustainable—all the while 
trying to keep up good relations with Argentina. Why should 
the court, which had clear procedural grounds for punting, 
make new law and volunteer to take the blame for a failed 
exchange, when all other responsible institutions seemed to 
wash their hands of Argentina? Given the opening, the judges 
handed the hot potato right back to the IMF and the G-7.
Of course the real aim of the NML maneuver was not so 
much to hoard defaulted paper but to pressure Argentina to 
settle at the risk of jeopardizing the restructuring. Th e prob-
lem for the illiquid debtor—which Argentina turned into a 
legal argument of sorts—is that paying oﬀ  one creditor in 
full before the closing encourages (nay, entitles) every other 
creditor to demand the same and turns the restructuring into 
a ﬁ rst-come ﬁ rst-served asset grab. Waiting until after the clos-
ing may encourage more holdouts the next time (few govern-
ments expect a next time on their watch) but at least would 
reduce current claimants to a more manageable pool. Even in 
GCAB’s assessment of Argentina’s ﬁ nances, the government 
could not pay all its creditors in full upfront.
Domestic bankruptcy laws are designed to preempt a 
disorderly grab race for the debtor’s limited assets. Th ese laws 
do not apply to sovereign governments. Argentina’s bond 
exchange seems to reaﬃ  rm the view that each sovereign debtor 
fashions its own regime for allocating assets among its credi-
tors.
After letting the restructuring go forward, the trial judge 
certiﬁ ed a new batch of class actions—all but certain to yield 
more judgments but no money for the creditors. Th ey might 
not appreciate the irony.
D O C U M E N TAT I O N :  A  S H I F T  I N  TO N E
Some bondholders had sued to stop Argentina’s oﬀ er on the 
grounds that it would use “exit consents”—ask tendering 
creditors to amend the old instruments to make them illiquid 
and even harder to enforce. Ecuador was the ﬁ rst to import 
the technique from corporate restructurings as part of its 1999 
Brady bond exchange. Since then, creditors have fought exit 
consents as unfairly coercive and have succeeded in raising the 
voting threshold for exit consents in many issues.
Th e litigants turned out to be wrong. Argentina did not 
use exit consents, nor did it specify a minimum participation 
threshold to make its exchange eﬀ ective. Th is approach was 
not an olive branch to its creditors. It might have reﬂ ected 
partly the reality of a mammoth exchange with so many diverse 
creditor constituencies, including unpredictable retail. It also 
reﬂ ected the government’s message since Dubai: Once it had 
decided how much it could aﬀ ord to pay, its ultimate threat 
to nonparticipating creditors was refusal to pay or to improve 
the terms. An exchange that relies on exit consents, which 
require threshold participation, by deﬁ nition has an element 
of consent. An exchange driven by the debtor’s promise to stiﬀ  
nonparticipants prioritizes debt relief over near-term market 
access.
In earlier exchanges, including Uruguay and the Argentine 
province of Mendoza, participating creditors amended the old 
bonds to withdraw the issuer’s sovereign immunity waiver with 
respect to the new bonds to protect new payments. Because 
Argentina chose to forego exit consents, it could not shield the 
new bonds in this way from lawsuits on the old.6
Argentina took a diﬀ erent approach to intercreditor equi-
ty. Th e “most favored creditor” (MFC) clause, which sought 
to assure participating creditors that holdouts would not get 
a better deal, was probably the most important and most 
controversial innovation in Argentina’s new bond contracts 
(box 1).
Similar language has appeared in corporate workouts and 
in sovereign workouts involving commercial banks (Buchheit 
2002). Argentina also used a similar device in the domestic 
swap shortly before the default. Th e structure of the MFC 
clause recalls other devices designed to level the playing ﬁ eld 
among creditors, such as the negative pledge clause or the 
sharing clause in syndicated loans. Th e borrower promises 
not to favor some creditors over others of equal rank and to 
distribute any new value proportionately among similarly 
situated creditors. Argentina’s initial version of the clause had 
6 Like Uruguay before it, Argentina got incremental protection by using a trust 
instead of a ﬁ scal agency structure.
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covered private settlement as well as new oﬀ ers, and it might 
have barred disproportionate recovery for litigants. Th e ﬁ nal 
version of the clause omitted the word “settlement,” potentially 
opening the door to holdout payments and issuer buybacks.
Public statements by some investors suggest that the MFC 
clause might have done more to alarm than to reassure them. 
Its perceived loopholes no doubt motivated the government 
in early February to pass a domestic law that raised the bar for 
reopening the exchange or settling with nonparticipating cred-
itors on the side. Th is inﬂ ation of commitment devices—the 
government tying its own hands to show the markets it means 
what it says—is oddly evocative of the defunct convertibility 
regime. For now, it is clear that the government is determined 
not to pay the holdouts. It is anyone’s guess whether and when 
this latest law might go the way of convertibility.
If the law stands, it might increase on the margins the 
government’s vulnerability to legal challenge. First, holdouts 
will surely argue that the law amounts to a legal act formally 
subordinating the old debt to the new in violation of the pari 
passu (equal ranking) covenant in the old bonds. Th e ques-
tion of whether creditors could use the pari passu clause to 
attack Argentina’s new payments was raised and deferred in 
the Southern District of New York in 2004. Without the law, 
Argentina might have argued that the new bonds did not eﬀ ect 
legal subordination—merely disproportionate payment.
Some have also argued that the law amounts to expropria-
tion within the meaning of Argentina’s bilateral investment 
treaties and is subject to challenge before the World Bank’s 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). If the claimants succeed in proving expropriation 
(none have on similar claims), it is far from clear that enforc-
ing an ICSID award would be any easier than collecting on a 
New York judgment. Th e government’s recent promise to ﬂ out 
other ICSID rulings is not encouraging.
In sum, the results of Argentina’s eﬀ orts at intercreditor 
equity remain uncertain. For now, bond documentation is a 
secondary constraint to domestic politics and domestic legis-
lation. It will come into play if and when Argentina brings 
itself to overcome these domestic factors and reach out to the 
holdouts.
In other respects, Argentina’s documentation is progressive 
but not revolutionary (Republic of Argentina 2005a). Its new 
bonds include collective action clauses pioneered by Mexico in 
2003, which have since become standard in emerging-market 
sovereign bonds. Most importantly, Argentina became the 
ﬁ rst government since Uruguay to include aggregated voting 
provisions in its shelf registration statement. Should Argentina 
choose to amend its debt documentation, it may proceed issue 
by issue, with 75 percent of the aggregate principal amount 
outstanding required to amend key terms. Alternatively, it 
could amend key terms in multiple issues with the approval of 
85 percent of the aggregate principal amount outstanding and 
two-thirds of the principal outstanding under every aﬀ ected 
issue. If it fails to secure the approval of any single issue, the 
amendment does not take eﬀ ect with respect to that issue, 
although the aﬃ  rmative votes count toward the 85 percent 
threshold.7 Bonds held by entities directly or indirectly owned 
or controlled by Argentina, including state-owned banks and 
pension funds, are ineligible to vote.
Aggregated voting makes sense when it can be conducted 
across a signiﬁ cant portion of a country’s debt stock. Because 
Argentina’s was the ﬁ rst comprehensive debt exchange since 
Uruguay’s, it was the ﬁ rst opportunity for a sovereign issuer 
since then to bring its debt stock within the aggregation frame-
work. Adapting recent contractual reforms across $35 billion 
in bonds with nary a protest from the markets is an impressive 
achievement and a milestone for the asset class (box 2).
WHAT IS NEXT FOR ARGENTINA AND THE WORLD
Immediately after the oﬀ er expired, Argentina’s government 
pronounced the default episode over: Argentina had emerged 
victorious from the ashes of crisis. Some market participants 
and editorial observers took a more sour view, though they 
7 For example, had Argentina’s defaulted bonds contained similar aggregated 
collective action clauses, issues in which NML and the Darts had bought 
controlling positions would have dropped out of the restructuring. 
Box 1 Most Favored Creditor Clause
“[I]f at any time on or prior to December 31, 2014, 
the Republic voluntarily makes an off er to purchase or 
exchange (a “Future Exchange Off er”) or solicits consents 
to amend (a “Future Amendment Process”) any outstand-
ing Non-Performing Securities, each Holder of Securities 
shall have the right, for a period of 30 calendar days fol-
lowing the announcement of any such Future Exchange 
Off er or Future Amendment Process, to exchange any 
of such Holder’s Securities for (as applicable):  (i) the 
consideration in cash or in kind received by holders of 
Non-Performing Securities in connection with any such 
Future Exchange Off er, or (ii) debt obligations having 
terms substantially the same as those resulting from any 
such Future Amendment Process. . . .” 
Source: Republic of Argentina (2005b).
N U M B E R  P B 0 5 - 2  S E P T E M B E R  2 0 0 5
7
too saw the exchange as an endpoint—proving that sovereign 
debtors could trample creditor rights with impunity and 
exuberance. Both conclusions seem premature.
No other sovereign restructuring has left behind anything 
close to $25 billion in holdouts. Argentina cannot and will not 
pay them all in full. What these creditors can do to Argentina 
and what Argentina can do about them is far from clear.
More litigation could bring doctrinal and policy shifts. 
Because Argentina privatized most of its economy in the 
1990s, the government has few commercial assets available 
to satisfy its creditors. As before, creditors will likely target 
oﬀ shore payments to or from Argentina when it issues new 
bonds.  For example, a US court could ﬁ nd that the exchange 
or, more likely, Argentina’s domestic law violated the pari passu 
clause in the defaulted bonds. Th e remedy might include an 
injunction against payments on the new bonds or some form 
of pro rata distribution.
Even if legally sound, such a ruling would raise critical 
policy concerns—it could turn the world’s largest payments 
systems into collection agencies. Recent Belgian court deci-
sions that had the same eﬀ ect prompted a law to shield Euro-
clear from injunctions. Early in the latest round of lawsuits 
against Argentina, the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, and the New York Clearing House all intervened 
on Argentina’s side on the pari passu issue, suggesting they 
will not let it be resolved in a policy vacuum. But inasmuch 
as Argentina’s domestic law hurts its case against pari passu 
enforcement, it also takes away a key legal argument for the 
supporting agencies. Th e fact that few if any other countries 
have enacted such laws also diminishes the systemic impor-
tance of Argentina’s case and the policy impetus for interven-
tion.
If creditors succeed with ICSID arbitration, governments 
might start pressing for new provisions in bilateral investment 
treaties to address sovereign debt default and restructuring. For 
example, Uruguay’s treaty with the United States speciﬁ cally 
shields it from expropriation claims by holdout creditors who 
had been outvoted using collective action clauses in Uruguay’s 
bonds. It is the only example of this approach to date.
Recent calls for new limits on foreign sovereign immu-
nity might gain momentum if Argentina ﬂ outs both court 
and ICSID rulings, and especially if other countries follow 
its example.
Among the more subtle eﬀ ects, settlement delay from the 
NML lawsuit may discourage certain investors—those who 
trade actively—from participating in defaulted debt exchanges 
Box 2 Bottom Fishers Save the Day
By the mid-1990s, it had become fashionable to criticize a certain kind of emerging-market investor—one that buys distressed 
debt at pennies on the dollar in the hope of collecting a fabulous return. The bottom fi sher and the maverick litigant were all 
the same in this view and equally threatening to the system since both would disrupt orderly workouts.
In fact, the litigant has turned out to be a small and distinct subspecies of the bottom fi sher. He does buy low—so low 
that he can aff ord to invest in pressing a claim and chasing phantom sovereign assets around the world for years. With the 
stark exception of the NML incident, which may or may not be repeated in light of the appellate court ruling, the litigant typi-
cally lies low until the restructuring is complete. He wants every other creditor to accept deep debt reduction, maximizing the 
country’s residual payment capacity and clearing the fi eld of competition. Beyond being a high-skill specialty sport, maverick 
litigation is self-limiting. While it is plausible for a country to pay $100 million or maybe even $1 billion quietly to get rid of 
the stalking nuisance, payment on the order of $25 billion seems improbable.
In contrast, the average bottom fi sher wants to get the maximum recovery for minimum eff ort, preferably over a short 
period. He may be an exemplary collective actor—content to join in the chorus pressing the debtor for a better deal and 
glad to share the proceeds with others who help secure that deal. The last thing he wants is a protracted stalemate. The two-
month settlement delay following NML’s March 2005 intervention in Argentina is precisely the sort of thing that upsets the 
bottom fi sher’s calculus and adds to his costs.
To the extent Argentina’s off ering was a success, bottom fi shers deserve part of the credit. Some bought Argentine 
bonds at 17 cents in 2002 and happily tendered in an exchange worth nearly double in 2005. Most probably bought in the 
closing weeks. They created a market where European retail investors could sell billions of dollars in defaulted bonds. Indi-
viduals traumatized by their foray into high-risk investing sold at a discount from exchange values. They might have saved 
money and tendered a week later—if they had the stomach to ride out the NML incident. They might have stayed out. In the 
end, the bottom fi shers pocketed the diff erence and assured the high level of participation in Argentina’s exchange.
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and possibly in other transactions that might be targeted by 
holdout litigants. Th ese investors may stay out altogether or, 
more likely, may demand a higher return in exchange for the 
perceived rise in settlement risk. A change in the behavior of a 
pivotal investor group could aﬀ ect the terms and outcome of 
a future exchange. On the other hand, broader market condi-
tions, such as the abundance of capital searching for yield, 
might well drown out any eﬀ ects of this altered risk percep-
tion. 
But the next act in Argentina’s restructuring drama prob-
ably will not be in court. It will unfold in the coming months 
as Argentina tries to negotiate its reﬁ nancing agreement with 
the IMF. Less than a year after it had walked away from its last 
IMF program, the government signaled a desire to reengage. 
Argentina sent representatives to Washington even before 
closing the debt exchange. Negotiations have been conten-
tious. Argentina and the IMF have argued over structural 
conditionality (taxes, banks, and utilities) and more recently 
over monetary policy, but the fate of the holdout creditors has 
weighed on the talks from the start.
In this respect, the encounter is tricky for the Fund and 
its shareholders. Th e oﬃ  cial sector has tried hard to keep its 
distance from Argentina’s bond restructuring operation but 
has found it equally hard to avoid the appearance of complic-
ity in the outcome. Now Argentina has decreed the restructur-
ing done. If the IMF does not accept Argentina’s contention 
that $25 billion in holdout claims are wholly uncollectable, it 
might see them as a threat to policy performance, as well as 
to program ﬁ nancing. If the IMF renews its program without 
addressing the holdout issue, it will have publicly ratiﬁ ed the 
exchange result and, by implication, the process Argentina 
used to obtain it. Yet the IMF’s recent history with Argentina 
limits the alternatives.
Th e oﬃ  cial sector uses three main tools to inﬂ uence the 
restructuring of sovereign debt held by private creditors. First, 
governments that agree to relieve a country’s debt in the Paris 
Club can press the debtor to seek comparable concessions 
from other creditors. Since Argentina’s Paris Club debt is tiny 
(under $2 billion) and yet to be restructured, this intervention 
avenue is not promising. Second, when a country secures a 
disbursing program from the IMF, it usually agrees to budget 
targets that frame its debt payment capacity over the life of 
the program. In this respect, Argentina’s September 2003 IMF 
program broke with precedent (IMF 2003a). In place of the 
customary primary budget surplus target, the IMF implied 
that Argentina must overperform a ﬂ oor target by the amount 
it would agree to pay its creditors. Th e oﬃ  cial sector gave up 
its say over the debtor’s payment capacity.
Instead, oﬃ  cials used the third tool—the IMF’s policy 
on lending into arrears, which allowed it to ﬁ nance a country 
that was making a good faith eﬀ ort to reach a collaborative 
agreement with its creditors (IMF 2002). Argentina’s conten-
tious relations with its creditors oﬀ ered the most serious 
test of the policy to date. Many argue that the IMF Board 
made a mockery of the policy by approving disbursements to 
Argentina despite its refusal to negotiate deal terms with its 
bondholders. Th e Argentine authorities point to their meet-
ings with creditors as evidence of good faith. Others question 
the relevance of a policy on lending into arrears to the case 
of Argentina, which has seen no net new multilateral lend-
ing since the default—program disbursements only partially 
covered Argentina’s repayments to the IMF.
As Argentina’s exchange drew near, the IMF Board inter-
preted its policy to require a comprehensive restructuring 
that restores debt sustainability. Th e IMF’s debt sustainabil-
ity analysis has not been published, though the oﬀ er terms 
are reportedly consistent with it. Th e IMF did not deﬁ ne 
“comprehensive” (though some Board members volunteered 
personal views on required participation). It is diﬃ  cult to 
accuse Argentina of making an unreasonable oﬀ er if the 
terms were indeed in line with the IMF’s own analysis and 
where over three-quarters of its creditors signed up. But the 
Fund may argue that 76 percent falls short of comprehensive, 
since Argentina can neither pay nor wish away $25 billion in 
presumptively conscientious objectors. Lending at this level of 
holdouts, including many retirees, would cause a political, if 
not a policy, problem. And so, since the exchange has closed 
and program talks have begun, the Fund and its shareholders 
have been exhorting the government in general terms to deal 
with the holdouts.
Th e Argentine government may yet save the Fund the 
embarrassment if it allows inﬂ ation to get out of hand or 
fails to meet structural conditionality in its program, such 
as reforming its tax system, ﬁ xing its banks, or settling its 
diﬀ erences with domestic utilities. Argentina might even 
decide to walk away again, since it has a relatively manage-
able debt service schedule for the next few years against the 
background of rapidly growing foreign reserves. On the other 
hand, judging by the fact that the defaulted debt trades at only 
a slight discount to the new performing bonds, the market 
expects Argentina to reopen its oﬀ er, securing or circumvent-
With $25 bil l ion in defaulted debt sti l l 
outstanding,  Argentina’s  most impor tant 
innovations may well  be ahead.
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ing domestic legislative approval sometime after the fall 2005 
elections. Mopping up as many holdouts as possible on equal 
or harsher terms is certainly in Argentina’s interest. On the 
other hand, the domestic political barrier to any new conces-
sions is extremely high. Moreover, reopening the old oﬀ er will 
do nothing to address the most serious litigation threat, which 
comes from professional holdouts such as NML and the Darts, 
aiming to recover close to 100 cents on the dollar. 
Th e Argentine experience so far suggests that the good 
faith iteration of the lending into arrears policy remains 
ﬂ awed. To an outside observer, recent statements indicate a 
lending standard in disarray. IMF staﬀ  are expert at designing 
macroeconomic and structural reform programs. Th ey have 
no special expertise in evaluating the quality of a country’s 
dialogue with its creditors. Proxies for good faith and collabo-
ration, such as the level of creditor participation in a debt 
exchange, are ultimately circular—they simply outsource the 
good faith determination back to the creditors and ignore any 
coercion factor that might have aﬀ ected participation. 
In Argentina’s case, the Fund appears both compelled and 
ultimately unable to judge fairness. In the words of IMF staﬀ , 
“[T]he credibility of the Fund’s policy will depend, in part, 
on a perception that the Fund actively promotes collabora-
tive resolution to debt diﬃ  culties that are [sic] seen as being 
generally fair to all parties” (IMF 2002). When the dust 
settles years from now, it may well turn out that the outcome 
of Argentina’s exchange was inevitable. For now, few if any 
participants would call it either collaborative or fair. To avoid 
losing more institutional credibility, the Fund may be wise to 
shelve further public reﬁ nement of the policy until after the 
Argentina episode has played out (box 3).
Th e last set of unanswered questions in the wake of the 
exchange concern Argentina’s impact on the international 
ﬁ nancial system. Already some Philippine and Nigerian legis-
lators announced that they would follow Argentina’s example 
and seek an aggressive restructuring of private debt. Th is 
could all be grandstanding, a common legislative pastime, or 
a signal of future defaults. But so far, there have been no pain-
less sovereign defaults—Argentina’s was far from it—and so 
it is probably too early to eulogize the asset class or market 
discipline in general.
If anything, Argentina’s default and restructuring has 
shown the terrible eﬀ ects of sovereign default on its people 
and institutions. Th e economy collapsed, along with the 
currency and the banking system; millions of people became 
desperately poor, as presidents and ministers lost their jobs in 
rapid succession. Th is domestic impact, more than the hope 
of market access or the threat of bondholder litigation, may be 
the biggest argument against default in the minds of emerg-
ing-market politicians. Argentina’s experience only reinforces 
it. It remains to be seen to what extent both debtor and credi-
tor losses from Argentina’s default will strengthen the case for 
preemptive exchanges on the Uruguay model.
On the other hand, Argentina’s crisis seems to suggest 
that default shifts the balance of power in favor of the debtor 
absent oﬃ  cial intervention. Once a government defaults, it 
must justify resuming payments. For as long as the economy 
can grow briskly without addressing defaulted government 
Box 3 Lending into Arrears
Through most of the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, IMF rules had barred it from lending to countries in payment default 
to their private creditors. As the commercial bank restructurings wore on, IMF policy had the eff ect of pressuring sovereign 
debtors to settle with private creditors to gain access to IMF funds. The IMF economic program at times was held hostage to 
private negotiations.
In 1989, the IMF Board adopted a new policy that allowed the Fund to lend notwithstanding member arrears to commer-
cial banks. In 1998, after most emerging-market debt had shifted into tradable bonds, and after several countries had trouble 
servicing those bonds, the IMF extended its policy to permit lending into arrears on bonded debt provided, among other 
things, that the country was negotiating in good faith with its creditors (IMF 2002).
The following year, the Fund modifi ed the good faith negotiation requirement in response to fears of holdout disrup-
tions. The new policy allowed lending where “(i) prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementa-
tion of the member’s adjustment program; and (ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a good faith 
eff ort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors.”
The good faith requirement was refi ned again slightly in 2002 to refl ect additional, mostly procedural, principles for 
engaging with creditors. Even with this improvement, few would hazard the meaning of “good faith” and “collaborative.”
Beyond its ambiguity, the good faith requirement ignores the IMF’s institutional bias in favor of lending to a country in crisis 
(Tarullo 2005). This bias is especially strong and justifi ed where a country has met all macroeconomic and structural conditions at the 
core of its IMF program. Withholding funds based on procedural failings in talks with private creditors would strain IMF credibility.
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debt, it is diﬃ  cult to see why a government would want to 
engage its creditors. Argentina’s postexchange issues have all 
been governed by Argentine law and used Argentine payment 
channels; however, considering the limited impact of lawsuits 
to date, it would be a stretch to attribute this funding strat-
egy to litigation risk. Instead, brisk demand for Russian and 
Argentine debt casts doubt on the theory that markets punish 
defaulters. Two years after Uruguay’s generous, polite, and 
preemptive restructuring, the spreads on its debt are embar-
rassingly close to Argentina’s. Good feelings from the markets 
may not be bankable after all. 
Argentina’s crisis also has done little so far to validate 
or discredit the idea of statutory sovereign bankruptcy. Th e 
government achieved impressive debt relief without either 
collective action clauses or bankruptcy. A three-month work-
out would have been preferable to a three-year one, but it is 
doubtful that any regime could have compressed the process 
to three months in a case of this scale and complexity. To 
the extent creditors had trouble coordinating, Argentina was 
able to exploit their diﬀ erences to get more relief and higher 
participation. Th e last-minute attack by NML delayed the 
closing but did not derail the exchange. Th e disruption seems 
hardly worth the institutional and political eﬀ ort it would take 
to revive the IMF’s proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM). On the other hand, $25 billion in hold-
outs still pose a risk to the outcome.
In the end, it is still too early to tell how Argentina might 
have changed the world. We may not know for years. For now, 
the revolution must wait.
R E F E R E N C E S
Buchheit, Lee C.  2002.  Th e Search for Intercreditor Parity. Law & 
Business Review of the Americas 8: 73.
GCAB (Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders). 2004. GCAB 
Roadshow Presentation (July 30). Available at www.gcab.org (accessed 
on August 26, 2005).
GCAB (Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders). 2005. GCAB 
Roadshow Presentation (January 23). Available at www.gcab.org 
(accessed on August 26, 2005).
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2002. Fund Policy on Lend-
ing into Arrears to Private Creditors—Further Considerations of the 
Good Faith Criterion (July 30). Washington. Available at www.imf.org 
(accessed on September 12, 2005).
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2003a. Argentina: Request for 
a Standby Arrangement and Request for an Extension of Repurchase 
Expectations (September 15). Washington. Available at www.imf.org 
(accessed on August 26, 2005).
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2003b. Lessons from the Crisis in 
Argentina (October 8). Washington. Available at www.imf.org (accessed 
on August 26, 2005). 
Mussa, Michael. 2002. Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to 
Tragedy. Policy Analyses in International Economics 67. Washington: 
Institute for International Economics.
Quarles, Randal K. 2004. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Inter-
national Aﬀ airs, testimony before the Senate Banking Committee: US 
Economic and Financial Policy Toward Argentina. Washington: US 
Department of the Treasury. Available at www.treas.gov (accessed on 
August 26, 2005).
Republic of Argentina. 2005a. Prospectus Supplement Dated January 
10, 2005, and Prospectus Dated December 27, 2004, ﬁ led pursuant 
to Rule 424(b)(5) under the US Securities Act of 1933, Registration 
No. 333-117111. Washington: United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Available at www.sec.gov (accessed on September 12, 
2005).
Republic of Argentina. 2005b. Form of U.S. Dollar-Denominated Par 
Bonds, Exhibit D.2 to Prospectus Dated December 27, 2004, ﬁ led 
pursuant to Rule 424(b)(5) under the US Securities Act of 1933, 
Registration No. 333-117111. Washington: United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Available at www.sec.gov (accessed on 
September 12, 2005).
Tarullo, Daniel K. 2005. Th e Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring. Chicago Journal of International Law (summer): 289–
311.
